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Abstract 
Discounting the value of emission credits has been proposed as a possible approach for 
addressing some of the shortcomings of the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). It could 
be used to compensate for non-additional CDM projects; to increase the incentive for 
advanced developing countries to move from the CDM to own mitigation commitments; and 
to improve the competitiveness of less developed countries as hosts for CDM projects. We 
assess the impact of discounting on the distribution of CDM projects in host countries, with a 
special focus on Least Developed Countries (LDCs). CDM-specific abatement cost curves are 
built for 4 regions: China, India, other advanced Asian countries and LDCs. Abatement costs 
are estimated using the information provided in the project documentation of 108 projects 
from 17 subtypes in 16 host countries. Abatement potentials are derived from the current 
CDM pipeline for each region. For LDCs, we additionally include an optimistic potential 
estimation by adding to the current pipeline the potential found by a World Bank study for 
LDCs in Sub-Saharan Africa. We then assess the effect of two emission credit discounting 
schemes on these abatement cost curves. Credit discounting is differentiated by host 
countries, based on an index composed of per capita GDP and per capita emissions. In the 
first scheme, it only affects the most advanced CDM host countries; in the second one it also 
affects China. We find that discounting has an impact on the competitiveness of individual 
CDM host countries in the carbon market, as it affects their abatement cost curves. It could 
become an instrument for incentivising advanced developing countries to leave the CDM and 
engage in other farther-reaching climate-related commitments, as a result of the resulting 
emission credit cost increases. However, even with discounting, LDCs remain unimportant in 
terms of abatement potential if the financial, technical and institutional barriers to CDM 
development in these countries are not overcome. 
 
Keywords: Climate policy; Kyoto Protocol; Clean Development Mechanism; Discounting; 
Abatement costs; Developing countries 
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1. Introduction 
Through the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), greenhouse gas emission reductions 
from projects in developing countries can be acquired by industrialised countries to comply 
with their Kyoto Protocol emission reduction targets. By the end of 2008 (UNEP Risoe Centre, 
2009), the CDM has mobilised almost 4500 projects, out of which 1300 have been formally 
registered with the CDM Executive Board and are thus accredited for generating emission 
credits1. Each tonne of CO2-equivalent emission reductions achieved by the CDM generates 
one emission credit, which is then used by industrialised countries (or companies in them) to 
offset their own emissions. Thus, each tonne reduced by a CDM project allows increasing 
emissions in industrialised countries by one tonne. Theoretically, this is no problem as long as 
the reduction from the CDM project is real and as long as incentives for introduction of 
emission reduction policies in developing countries are not distorted. About 2.7 billion 
emission credits are expected to be generated in total by CDM projects by 2012. 
The key criterion for ensuring that emission reductions from CDM projects are real is 
“additionality”. Additionality means that a CDM project has to be outside the “business-as-
usual” development scenario for its region or country. This is, there are financial, economic, 
technical or other barriers for its implementation, which only the CDM incentive manages to 
overcome. This is a necessary condition for CDM projects to really contribute to reducing 
global GHG emissions: If a CDM project is not additional, using its emission credits to offset 
emissions in industrialised countries will lead to an actual increase in emissions. There is 
substantial criticism that a significant amount of CDM projects does not have a very credible 
additionality argumentation (see e.g. Castro and Michaelowa, 2008; Michaelowa and Purohit, 
2007; Schneider, 2007). 
The CDM was designed with the idea of an instrument to introduce developing countries to 
climate policy in a voluntary manner, without affecting their development objectives. It was 
                                               
1 Throughout this paper, the term “emission credits” is used to refer to the CDM’s Certified Emission 
Reductions (CERs). 
 4
conceived as a transitional step before these countries also commit to own emission reduction 
targets. However, a shortcoming of the CDM is that the financial subsidy generated by the 
sale of emission credits may turn into a disincentive for advanced developing countries to 
take up emissions reduction commitments. Further, the CDM project portfolio is very 
unevenly distributed across potential host countries. China, India and Brazil account for over 
71% of all projects and 76% of expected emission credits. Least Developed Countries (LDCs) 
host just 41 CDM projects in the pipeline (0.9%), out of which only 10 projects are 
registered. Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) hosts 66 projects, but South Africa, accounts for 41% of 
these (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2009). The Marrakech Accords that specify the detailed rules of 
the mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol emphasise the importance of an equitable 
geographical distribution of CDM projects across countries and regions (UNFCCC, 2001); 
several studies have discussed the impact of this distribution on equity, efficiency and 
environmental considerations (Cosbey et al., 2005; Keller, 2008). Mitigation potential, 
institutional CDM capacity and general investment climate have been used as predictors of 
attractiveness of CDM host countries for CDM projects (Jung, 2005). Further, familiarity 
between investing country and host country, operationalised as past bilateral trade, past 
bilateral aid and colonial relationship, was found by Dolšak and Bowerman Crandall (2007) to 
be an even more important factor explaining CDM location decisions. More recently, Keller 
(2008) finds that population size is the most important variable influencing the location of 
CDM projects across host countries, which gives a different perspective to the discussion on 
the “unfairness” of CDM project distribution. When excluding the four largest host countries 
from the sample, he also finds that abatement potential, institutional framework and CDM 
capacities all have some explanatory power among countries of similar size.  
While economic efficiency considerations dictate that the emission reductions should first take 
place wherever they are cheaper, equity concerns suggest that the CDM incentive should be 
more proactively directed towards less developed countries. These concerns are politically 
founded on the second goal of the CDM, which is to contribute to sustainable development in 
its host countries. Further, more autonomous climate mitigation action by advanced 
developing countries (beyond just offsetting) is needed to achieve the long-term 
 5
environmental goals of the climate convention, which would mean that a system for gradually 
phasing out the CDM in these countries is needed (Cosbey et al., 2005; Schneider, 2008). 
Discounting the value of emission credits according to host countries has been proposed as a 
possible approach for addressing these shortcomings of the CDM. As we will elaborate further 
below, discounting could be used to compensate for fictitious reductions from non-additional 
CDM projects; it could be designed to increase the incentive for advanced developing 
countries to move from the CDM to own mitigation commitments; and it could also be applied 
to improve the competitiveness of less developed countries as hosts for CDM projects.  
This paper thus seeks to assess the impact that a new policy, discounting of emission credits, 
could have on the geographical distribution of the CDM, with a special focus on Least 
Developed Countries and Sub-Saharan Africa. Section 2 briefly summarises the existing 
research on discounting emission credits and its possible impacts on carbon markets. In 
section 3 we discuss the relationship between discounting of emission credits and host 
country competitiveness in the CDM. In section 4 we provide estimates for emission credit 
costs and potentials for different project types in Africa and other CDM host regions, based 
on previous studies and our own empirical research on the current CDM project portfolio. 
Section 5 analyses the impact of two emission credit discounting schemes on the competitive 
position of these CDM host regions by looking at the remaining CDM potential in these 
country groups. Section 6 discusses the results and draws the conclusions from this study.  
 
2. Discounting emission credits 
Discounting CDM emission reductions means that not all reductions generated by a project 
enter the carbon market, so that part of the effort is not used to offset emissions elsewhere, 
but provides real global GHG emission reductions (Schneider, 2008).  
Why is such a discounting policy desirable, if the CDM is intended to make emission 
reductions cheaper? Discounting was first proposed by Greenpeace (2000) as a measure to 
safeguard the environmental integrity and the additionality of the CDM. This was a response 
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to the widespread critique that it is very difficult to prove that a project proposed as CDM is 
not a business-as-usual situation and is thus leading to “real” emission reductions. Using 
discounting to safeguard additionality is however a complex task, as it would imply knowing 
the share of non-additional credits being issued despite all quality checks, and modifying the 
discount factor over time to reflect possible changes in this share. This would deter investors 
and, more importantly, penalise both non-additional and truly additional projects. For a 
numerical example of how additionality-based discounting could work, see Michaelowa 
(2008). 
The early discussion on discounting also suggested that it could be used to compensate for 
the uncertainty related to establishing baselines, to provide an incentive for greater domestic 
action in countries with reduction targets, and to penalise negative social and environmental 
effects of CDM projects (Jackson and Begg, 1999). Ten years later, the discussion still 
focuses on using discounting for improving the CDM’s environmental integrity, while 
influencing other shortcomings of the mechanism as well. Environmental Defense (2007), for 
example, proposed to differentiate discount rates across countries in order to “discourage 
further use of the CDM by large emitting developing countries and to direct the mechanism 
towards poorer developing countries” (ibid, p. 2). This is in line with the political objective, 
enshrined in the Kyoto Protocol itself, that the CDM should assist developing countries in 
achieving sustainable development, and that it should do it in an equitable manner (UNFCCC, 
2001). It is also in line with the now recognised fact that the current system of emission 
reduction targets for industrialised countries and the CDM for developing countries is not 
enough for ensuring a long-term stabilisation of the climate system (Gupta et al., 2007). More 
climate mitigation action by developing countries, especially the large and advanced ones, is 
needed. 
Chung (2007) proposed discounting as contribution of developing countries to global emission 
reductions without having to resort to country-specific commitments. This idea could be 
developed into a system where discounting provides an incentive for advanced developing 
countries to take up emissions reduction commitments. Discounting would build such an 
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incentive, as taking up a commitment means that reductions achieved through domestic 
reduction projects count 100%, whereas under the discounting scheme, they would be 
valued less. The incentive would increase if the discount factor was progressively linked to 
the level of development of the host country (Michaelowa, 2008). Discounting by countries 
could also be used to promote CDM project development in African and Least Developed 
Countries by applying lower or no discount rates (or even granting more credits than 
reductions actually achieved) for projects in these countries (Schneider, 2008). 
Discounting could also be varied according to project types, as suggested by Chung (2007) 
and elaborated by Schneider (2008). Thus, projects with beneficial characteristics could be 
favoured over less desired ones by assigning them a lower discount rate, no discount rate or 
even a multiplier above 1. For example, projects with large sustainable development benefits 
or using innovative technologies could be favoured, while projects with very large windfall 
profits or questionable additionality could be burdened. Despite these promising features, 
agreeing upon such a set of different discount rates could become very challenging at the UN 
level. Sustainable development priorities are defined differently by each country and their 
valuation is still very subjective and complex. The level of innovativeness of a technology is 
subjective to contextual factors, e.g. to the host country. Additionality depends not only on 
project type, but also on country-specific factors. This complexity would make it difficult even 
for technical experts to set appropriate discounting factors. Therefore we do not assess this 
type of discounting.  
There are basically two approaches for implementing a discounting policy in the CDM. Supply-
side discounting implies that only a certain fraction of the verified emission reductions leads 
to issuance of emission credits. This type of discounting would require an agreement at the 
UN level, but would have the advantage of being applicable to the whole carbon market. 
Demand-side discounting means that a percentage of the issued credits is retired from the 
market by the buyers, sending it for example to a cancellation account. Demand-side 
discounting allows for different credit buyers to set different discount rates, which would 
complicate the linking of different emission trading schemes and could distort emission credit 
 8
prices (Schneider, 2008). While demand-side discounting makes little sense from a pure 
economic point of view, as demanding countries are expected to aim at getting as many 
credits as possible for the lowest price possible, political and environmental reasons are 
influencing these decisions. For example, the American Clean Energy and Security Act passed 
in the House of Representatives in June 2009 includes a discounting provision for 
international offsets (which would include CDM credits): from 2018 on, one international 
offset will be equivalent to 0.8 emission allowances in the US market (Pew Center, 2009). 
The reasons for such a demand-driven discounting scheme are, on the one hand, improving 
the environmental integrity of the scheme, and on the other, promoting domestic green jobs 
by favouring domestic reductions (or domestic offsets) over international ones. As the 
American market is expected to become the largest carbon market in the world, carbon credit 
sellers will not be able to escape such a unilateral discounting provision.  
We use Environmental Defense’s and Chung’s suggestions that discounting could be used to 
improve the geographical distribution of CDM projects as a starting point, and elaborate on 
Michaelowa’s proposal for a differentiation between host countries. We try to answer the 
question whether such a discounting scheme with differentiation between host countries 
could really have an impact on host country competitiveness in the CDM market, with focus 
on Least Developed Countries. 
 
3. Discounting emission credits and host country competitiveness 
Discounting emission credits will have an impact on the value and the amount of emission 
reductions from different CDM host countries. The higher the discount rate, the less credits 
are issued or traded for the project, and thus the higher the abatement cost. At the same 
time, the higher the discount rate, the less emissions reductions are credited, so the more the 
mitigation potential is penalised. Increased costs and reduced potentials are likely to lower 
the competitiveness of the CDM host countries affected by discounting. 
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The competitiveness or attractiveness of individual CDM host countries depends on several 
general and CDM-specific factors. Following Ellis and Kamel (2007), Michaelowa (2003) and 
Silayan (2005), important general considerations are: 
- An enabling business environment: stable and transparent general institutional 
framework, stable and predictable investment laws 
- The existence of relevant financial incentives, such as tax reductions for renewable 
energies, import tariff reductions for CDM technology, etc. 
- Reduced ownership restrictions for foreigners 
- Undistorted energy pricing policies 
- Local technical capacity and awareness of the CDM as a project financing option 
- Availability of underlying project finance, especially through local financial capacity 
- Availability of large and cheap CDM project options, whose value can offset the 
transaction costs of the CDM pipeline; this is coupled to the country’s emissions 
mitigation potential 
- Other country or project-related risks that render the performance of the project 
uncertain 
- Existence of historical business or aid relationship with emissions credit buyer (Dolšak 
and Bowerman Crandall, 2007). 
CDM-specific criteria are: 
- Existence of CDM-related institutions: Kyoto Protocol ratification and establishment of 
an operational national CDM approval authority  
- Clear, capable and effective CDM policy framework: clear rules for national approval, 
timely and simple procedures, low national transaction costs, experience and 
continuity of national approval staff 
- Existence of CDM promotion offices 
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- CDM awareness in government, industry, consultants and financial intermediaries 
- Existence of baseline data for project design 
- Existence of applicable CDM methodologies for the desired project type 
- Constraints on eligibility of specific project types – for example by the EU ETS or 
other major credit buyers 
- Capacity of auditing companies (validators or “Designated Operational Entities”) in 
the relevant region 
- Temporary credits for certain project types, which have lower value in the market. 
 
Discounting will clearly have no effect on the host country’s business environment, on the 
institutional framework or on technological and methodological capacity. Some other 
measures have been undertaken in several countries to overcome at least the institutional 
barriers: The Nairobi Framework is an initiative launched during the climate negotiations in 
Nairobi in December 2006, aimed at enhancing the geographic distribution of CDM projects 
mainly through capacity building. It has contributed to improve some of the CDM-specific 
criteria, by establishing CDM authorities and approval rules, as well as creating awareness in 
the public and private sectors and initiating project portfolios in many countries. However, it 
was unable to integrate the financial actors. Further, capacity building has not addressed 
more technical needs, such as generating data for baselines or designing methodologies for 
project types that are more likely in less developed countries (Okubo and Michaelowa, 2010).  
Discounting could contribute to further improve project-specific and cost-related factors by 
shifting the financial incentives of the CDM towards more backward countries, and could thus 
contribute to fostering CDM development in, for example, Sub-Saharan Africa or the Least 
Developed Countries.  
However, more structural factors, such as political and economic stability, mitigation 
potential, technical capacity, and infrastructure are more difficult to change in the short term.  
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As discounting will not have an impact on the institutional criteria but rather on the value of 
emission reductions from different countries, we will focus our subsequent analysis on the 
host country potential for specific abatement technologies, and their abatement cost.  
 
4. Estimating emission credit costs and CDM potentials  
Right now, some individual CDM host countries or regions have sufficiently large CDM project 
portfolios to be able to empirically estimate the cost of emission credits for specific project 
types, and possibly, regions. In addition, assessments of GHG mitigation potentials in 
different regions, including Africa, are available from the literature (e.g. Bakker et al., 2007; 
de Gouvello et al., 2008; Vattenfall, 2007; Wetzelaer et al., 2007).  
On the basis of these empirical abatement costs and potentials for specific regions, we can 
estimate how different discounting schemes could affect those regions’ competitiveness in the 
emission credit market, if we assume that abatement costs and potentials are the main 
criteria for locating CDM projects (i.e., if we disregard the institutional and legal dimensions 
described in section 3).  
 
4.1 Emission credit costs 
General CDM project information is available from a public database, the CDM pipeline, which 
is maintained and updated monthly by UNEP Risoe Centre (UNEP Risoe Centre, 2009). More 
specific information for each project is also publicly available in the project documentation 
that can be downloaded from the CDM website of the UN2. For some projects, this 
documentation contains financial information, which we use for estimating emission 
abatement costs for the different CDM project technologies.  
                                               
2 Each project has a standardised “Project Design Document” (PDD), which is used throughout the 
approval process and is publicly available for analysis. 
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Project financial information can be provided in the documentation as Internal Rate of Return 
(IRR), as Net Present Value (NPV), as full cash flows or not at all. We define a project’s 
abatement costs as the net present value of the project costs (investment and operation) 
minus its revenues (e.g. income from electricity sales), all divided by the amount of GHG 
emission reductions it expects to achieve (which is indicated by the amount of emission 
credits the project expects to generate over its lifetime, also time-discounted).  
Overall abatement costs provide a measure of the profitability and attractiveness of the 
project – if the costs are negative, the project is profitable even without the CDM profit; if 
they are low enough, they can be compensated through the sale of credits; and if they are 
too high, the project is not profitable even with emission credit sales. However, not only this 
overall profitability is relevant for the decision to undertake a project, but also the upfront 
costs, since they need to be covered by financial resources that are frequently scarce, risky 
and difficult to access in developing countries. Therefore, in this paper we also analyse 
project investment costs per credit. 
We have done abatement and investment cost estimations for a sample of CDM projects in 
16 host countries. The first intention was to evaluate project costs in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) and Least Developed Countries (LDC). However, as of end of 2008 there are only 26 
registered projects in these countries, few of which contain sufficient financial information. 
China was thus first included in this assessment due to its large project portfolio, which 
makes it easy to compare similar projects and their abatement costs and thus find possible 
outliers; its tendency to use the “investment analysis” for additionality demonstration rather 
than the “barrier analysis”, which rarely provides sufficient financial information3; the large 
                                               
3 The demonstration of additionality is a crucial step for CDM project approval. It is usually performed 
by applying a standardised tool, whose central pieces are either a “barrier analysis” or an “investment 
analysis”. The first one is intended to describe the barriers of technological, financial or other nature 
that would prevent the implementation of the project in the absence of the CDM, while the latter should 
show that the financials of the project (e.g. internal rate or return or net present value) are not 
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diversity of project types and sizes being implemented there; and its still relatively low rural 
development level, which in some provinces is similar to the situation in LDCs. Finally, 
projects from other countries were included in the sample for project subtypes that were not 
sufficiently represented yet. The sample consists thus of 108 projects from 17 project 
subtypes in 16 countries, as can be seen in Table 1.  
 
Insert Table 1 approximately here 
 
4.1.1 Full abatement costs 
Two important factors in the abatement cost calculations of a project – also shown in Table 1 
– are its expected lifetime and the financial discount rate used for obtaining its present value. 
Cost calculations in CDM projects have the tendency to consider a lifetime equal to its 
crediting period4, even if the project will have a longer life. As most CDM projects choose a 
3x7-year crediting period, the lifetime considered in the calculations tends to be 20 or 21 
years. Some projects even consider just 7 years, especially those where the only income 
stream is the emission credit revenue. Some others – especially hydro projects – 
acknowledge a longer operational lifetime, but consider the CDM revenue only during the 
crediting period. We do not homogenise project lifetimes, but take the lifetime that most 
likely informed the investment decision by the project proponent: the CDM crediting period, 
in the case of projects with only income from emission credits, or the whole operational 
lifetime, in the case of projects with other revenue streams.  
                                                                                                                                      
attractive without the CDM. It is up to the project developer to choose which one of these analyses he 
wishes to apply. 
4 The crediting period is the period of time during which a CDM project is entitled to receive emission 
credits. Project developers can choose between a fixed 10-year crediting period or a 7-year crediting 
period that can be renewed up to two times (thus totalling 21 years).  
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Project financial discount rates and financial benchmarks are also chosen by the project 
proponent, but need to be justified. Financial discount rates appear to be relatively constant 
within countries and sectors, at least within the energy sector in China, where most projects 
use a factor of 8%, and smaller or riskier ones apply 10 or 12%. Still, there is significant 
variation in the financial discount rates chosen for projects in the energy efficiency category, 
for example, maybe due to the high variety of industries implementing these efficiency 
measures (cement, chemicals, iron and steel, coke ovens, etc). In order to have comparable 
information and to avoid the possible effect of financial discount rates being manipulated by 
project developers to obtain more convincing financial figures5, we homogenise the financial 
discount rates in each host country. The choice of financial discount rate is guided by the 
rates proposed by most CDM projects in the respective country. In countries where the 
project documentation does not supply this information, a default 10% has been taken. See 
Table 2 for an overview of host countries, financial discount rates used in them, and 
standardised financial discount rates.  
 
Insert Table 2 approximately here 
 
To obtain the abatement cost per tonne of CO2eq emissions reduced, we take in the 
denominator the amount of emission credits the project expects to generate over its lifetime 
(thus, over 10 or over 21 years, depending on the choice of crediting period by the project 
developer), discounted with the same financial discount rate as the one used for the costs. In 
this way we obtain constant emission credit costs6. 
                                               
5 Project developers have an incentive to manipulate their figures and try to show low revenues, so that 
the project appears financially unattractive, which is a requisite for being considered additional.  
6 In a previous version of this paper, we made the cost estimations on the basis of the full (non-
discounted) amount of emission credits, but just from the first crediting period (this is, over 10 or over 7 
years). This approach was chosen due to the uncertainty involved in crediting period renewal, and the 
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CDM transaction costs have not been included in the estimations. Even though transaction 
costs represent a significant sum, especially for small-scale projects, we have opted for 
simplifying the calculations in this assessment.  
Another important consideration in the abatement cost calculations is the treatment of the 
baseline costs. The baseline is generally conceived as the situation without project. This 
situation without project may imply a different investment or the continuation of the current 
situation without a new investment. Many energy-related CDM projects argue that their 
baseline is the status quo, the continuation of the present situation without investment. In 
some cases, this implies expenses, such as buying energy from the grid or buying coal. In 
these cases, avoiding or reducing these expenses is considered as a revenue for the project 
and is included in the abatement cost calculations. But in some other cases, the baseline 
situation does not imply costs for the project owner, and thus is not included in the 
calculations. In very few cases, the baseline represents a new investment, e.g. in a new fossil 
fuel-based power plant. Avoiding this investment is again considered as a saving achieved by 
the project.  
Figures 1 and 2 show box plots of the estimated abatement costs of the projects in the 
sample, both with the original financial discount rates and with the financial discount rates 
standardised by us, respectively.  
 
Insert Figures 1 and 2 approximately here 
 
                                                                                                                                      
resulting high likelihood that project developers calculated their profitability on the basis of the emission 
credits from just the first crediting period. However, time-discounting also controls for this uncertainty 
and leads to a clearer interpretation of the cost estimates. The results from both cost estimation 
approaches do not differ substantially.  
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In these results, it is clear that even within project subtypes there is still a high variability in 
cost estimations, and that thus these estimations need to be taken with care. However, even 
with this high variability, our results reproduce very closely the range and ranking of costs 
reported in other abatement cost studies (US EPA, 2006; Vattenfall, 2007; Wetzelaer et al., 
2007): Methane and industrial gas reduction projects are cheaper than CO2-reduction 
projects, basically due to the higher global warming potential of these other gases; renewable 
energy projects, specifically wind and hydro projects including the construction of dams and 
also natural gas power plants are among the costlier ones. All this is consistent with other 
abatement cost curves and supports our results. The abatement costs of most of these CDM 
projects are below 20 US$, which is an indication that the emission credit income could make 
them attractive. 
The variability of costs within project subtypes stems from various factors. Above we have 
already discussed the impact of project lifetimes and financial discount rates on the cost 
estimations, and these figures can be manipulated easily to make projects appear non-
attractive. However, there are also large differences in the technologies used within project 
subtypes. For example, biogas power projects can consist of a sophisticated bioreactor, or 
just of a plastic membrane covering the already existing anaerobic lagoons, which allows to 
capture the methane. Further, biodigesters can be imported or can be manufactured 
domestically, which will also have an impact on costs. Biomass projects include energy 
generation from rice husks, bagasse, palm oil residues, forest residues, and a variety of other 
agricultural or industrial by-products. Energy efficiency projects take place in cement, steel, 
chemical, petrochemical and other industries and can encompass different efficiency 
measures. Hydroelectric projects have very different sizes, and smaller ones (among those 
including a dam) typically imply higher abatement costs. Finally, different countries can have 
different cost structures, with differing energy prices, taxes or financial incentives for specific 
technologies that may have an impact on overall abatement costs. Ideally, we should have a 
different project sample for each host country and estimate country-specific CDM abatement 
costs, however, due to time constraints and to the fact that most countries still have too few 
registered CDM projects, this has not been possible. 
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Another important point to discuss in these results is the existence of CDM projects with net 
negative abatement costs. If we consider the financial discount rates used by the project 
proponents in the project documentation, these negative-cost projects are only two, just one 
biomass energy and one energy efficiency project. The biomass project substantiates its 
additionality through a barrier analysis, but includes an annex showing the cash flow of the 
project with a positive Net Present Value. The energy efficiency project substantiates 
additionality through the comparison with an alternative project: even if the CDM project 
activity has a positive NPV, the alternative has an even better one, so that it would be the 
preferred course of action.  
If we take country-standardised financial discount rates, also some other projects have 
negative costs, and surprisingly, run-of-river hydroelectric projects and own-generation 
energy efficiency projects even have a mean negative cost. Our whole sample in these 
project categories is from China, where most projects originally used 8% as financial discount 
rate, while some hydro projects used 10% and energy efficiency ones even higher rates. We 
standardised all Chinese financial discount rates to 8%, on the grounds that most energy-
related projects in this country use this figure. But then, half of the energy efficiency projects 
and all hydro projects that originally took 10% financial discount rate become financially 
attractive.  
 
4.1.2 Up-front investment costs  
One of the main barriers for investing in infrastructure in Least Developed Countries and Sub-
Saharan Africa is the availability of up-front financing. The main costs of renewable energy 
projects are investment costs, as they do not bear annual fuel costs. Whether CDM revenues 
can cover a substantial amount of the up-front investment costs could constitute an 
important factor in the decision to undertake a project or not7. For these reasons, we have 
                                               
7 In this context, again the consideration of which credits are considered in the cost calculations (just 
pre-2012 credits, those expected from the first crediting period, or those from all crediting periods) is 
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repeated our empirical estimation using total investment costs per emission credit. The 
results are shown on Figure 3. 
 
Insert Figure 3 approximately here 
 
Here again, we observe a high variance in the investment costs of the different project 
subtypes. As in the case of the full abatement costs, this reflects the variability in 
technologies used, their origin, and the project sizes. On the other hand, the sequence of 
project types according to investment costs is again consistent with the previous 
assessments: projects involving new infrastructure, such as large renewable energy projects 
or gas power plants have larger investment costs. Projects involving a relatively small change 
in a process, such as N2O reduction, landfill or biogas projects have smaller costs.  
 
4.2  CDM emission abatement potentials 
There are few comprehensive studies on the emissions abatement potential in developing 
countries. Notable are the studies by Wetzelaer et al. (2007), Bakker et al. (2007) and, more 
recently, De Gouvello et al. (2008). 
Based on data from climate mitigation studies in 30 countries, Wetzelaer et al. (2007) 
developed an abatement cost curve for the non-Annex I region in the year 2010, focusing 
mainly on CO2 and to a lesser extent on CH4 emission reductions.  
The study concluded that the total abatement potential for the whole non-Annex I region in 
the year 2010 amounts to about 2 Gt CO2eq/yr at a price of US$ 50/tCO2eq or less. About 
one third of this potential is expected to be achievable at negative or zero incremental costs. 
                                                                                                                                      
critical for investment decisions. For similar reasons as above, we consider again that all credits 
projected for the first crediting period are used in these calculations.  
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Approximately 1.7 Gt CO2eq/yr appear feasible at costs of up to US$ 4/tCO2eq, including 
transaction costs. 66% of the total abatement potential was found in China (37%), India 
(23%), Brazil (4%) and South Africa (2%) (Wetzelaer et al., 2007).  
Building on the above-mentioned study, Bakker et al. (2007) tried to find the market potential 
of abatement options in non-Annex I countries by 2020. Their study differentiates between 
technical abatement potential (reductions that can be realised based on technical and 
physical parameters), economic potential (reductions that can be realised below a certain 
cost level) and market potential (reductions that can be realised considering other barriers). 
Bakker et al. (2007) updated and completed the abatement cost curves, by including 
information from new country studies, extrapolating them from 2010 to 2020, and adding 
new technology options (carbon capture and storage, and forestry) and non-CO2 GHGs. In 
order to find out the market emissions reduction potential, they included a scenario-based 
analysis of the impacts of different CDM-related factors on the abatement potential: the 
eligibility of technologies under the CDM, the future application of the additionality criterion, 
the success of programmatic CDM, the investment climate and institutional environment in 
the host countries, and the existence of non-financial barriers related to the uptake of 
technology. In the scenarios, only the abatement potential of the options was varied, not the 
cost. Accounting for the uncertainties related to eligibility decisions, additionality criteria, 
programmatic CDM and technology adoption, the market potential for CDM projects was 
estimated at 1.6 - 3.2 GtCO2eq/yr at costs up to 20 €/tCO2eq in 2020.  
In these and other GHG abatement cost studies, the estimated potential of GHG reduction 
options with net negative costs is significant. Such “no-regret” reduction options seem to 
conflict with rational behaviour. The reasons for their existence mentioned in the literature 
include market imperfections leading to lack of knowledge about the reduction options, 
misaligned incentives of companies and consumers, social preferences, lack of priority, lack of 
investments due to limited financial markets and the definition of cost (social versus financial 
cost). The least-cost abatement measures – especially demand-side energy efficiency 
measures - imply mobilising billions of diffuse emission sources across many sectors and 
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regions, and thus achieving them may be politically challenging. It is often suggested that in 
order to remove these market barriers, further costs are incurred that should be added to the 
technology costs. These costs are not normally included in abatement cost studies (Bakker et 
al., 2007; Enkvist et al., 2007; Wetzelaer et al., 2007). 
A study commissioned by the World Bank (De Gouvello et al., 2008) has looked at the 
abatement potential in the energy sector in Sub-Saharan Africa, using the existing CDM 
methodologies to identify technologies that could promote GHG emission reductions and at 
the same time support energy development in the region. They have thus built a bottom-up 
inventory of clean energy projects applying 22 technologies in 44 countries in SSA, which 
includes over 3200 projects, among them 361 programmes of activities. These projects would 
amount to more than 170 GW of additional power-generation capacity, which is more than 
twice the region’s current installed capacity, providing about four times the region’s current 
modern-energy production. The resulting GHG emissions reduction potential would total 
about 740 million tCO2 per year, and would be mainly related to the biomass sector.  
This study also included estimated investment costs for many of the technologies found, but 
did not include a full economic analysis. Even investment data were unavailable for projects 
representing 36% of added power-generation capacity and 21% of emission reductions (De 
Gouvello et al., 2008). 
 
4.3 Costs and potentials – abatement cost curves 
Combining the information on standardised abatement costs for emission credit generation 
and CDM potential in different countries or regions, we obtain our basis for the comparison of 
CDM competitiveness: abatement cost curves.  
Figure 4 shows abatement cost curves for China, India, LDCs, and a group of selected high-
income high-emissions Asian countries (Qatar, United Arab Emirates, Singapore, South Korea, 
Israel) without discounting the emission credits.  
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Insert Figure 4 approximately here 
 
As abatement costs we use the median standardised abatement cost obtained for each 
project sub-type from our sample. HFC-23 reduction projects, very prominent in China and 
India, typically lack financial data in the project documentation, as their additionality (the 
main reason why financial information is disclosed) is guaranteed due to the fact that the 
only income stream for these projects is the sale of emission reduction credits. For this type 
of projects, abatement cost estimations from secondary sources (Harnisch and Hendricks, 
2000; Jimenez, 2005; UNEP TEAP, 2002) have been used. 
The abatement potential is estimated simply by summing up all emission reductions projected 
to be achieved by all projects in the CDM pipeline as of end of 2008 (UNEP Risoe Centre, 
2009). This is a very approximate estimate. On the one hand, it does not include CDM 
projects not yet submitted for validation, so the potential may increase over the following 
years. On the other hand, it includes projects that may fail validation or registration, whose 
potential will thus not materialise. Finally, this estimation does not take into account the fact 
that credit issuance is for most project types actually less than the estimations provided in 
the project documentation. However, as these sources of bias are present in CDM projects 
over all host countries, we deemed these figures to be precise enough for our comparison.  
For the group of Least Developed Countries, we include two estimations. The first one (“LDCs 
existing”) is, as above, the sum of all emission reductions projected from the current CDM 
pipeline in this region. The second estimation (“LDCs potential”) additionally includes the 
abatement potential estimated by De Gouvello et al. (2008) for the LDCs in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, excluding the potential from biofuel projects, which so far do not have any approved 
methodologies. This provides an optimistic estimation of the abatement potential in these 
countries, which could be achieved if the technical, financial and institutional conditions are 
substantially improved.  
It should be noted that these curves include project types without cost information. These 
appear at present at the left end of the curves, as having zero abatement costs. The projects 
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without cost information represent 1.7% of the abatement potential in China, 8.6% in the 
advanced host countries, 7.3% in LDCs existing, 7.9% in LDCs potential and 26.5% in India. 
In the Indian case, about one third of this potential comes from supply-side energy efficiency 
projects, for which abatement costs should be similar that those in own generation energy 
efficiency projects, which have net negative costs when standardising the financial discount 
rates. Unfortunately, the financial information for supply-side energy efficiency is either non-
existing or not very credible in the project documents analysed. While this inclusion might 
provide the wrong impression of a large quantity of low-cost (or zero-cost) project options, 
we opted for not omitting these data from the curves as they allow for a more realistic 
picture of the overall abatement potential.  
 
5. Empirical assessment of the effect of discounting in selected 
countries 
In this section we include the effect of two possible discounting schemes on the CDM 
abatement cost curves of the selected regions and countries. 
 
 
5.1 Discounting scheme 1 
We use per capita GDP and per capita emissions as the criteria for defining the discount 
factor for emission reductions, which captures the principles of capability to pay and 
responsibility towards climate change. Each country’s GDP per capita and emissions per 
capita are compared to the average values for the whole world, using the data from IEA 
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(2007). Both proportions are given the same weight, as both principles are equally important 
and are not directly correlated. Thus, the discount factors8 are calculated as follows:  
 
Negative discount factors are not permitted, since this would imply issuing more than one 
emissions credit per tonne of emissions reduced. Table 3 shows the resulting discount factors 
for some countries included in this study. See Michaelowa (2008) for a more detailed 
description of this discounting scheme, including the calculations for other countries.  
 
Insert Table 3 approximately here 
Insert Figure 5 approximately here 
 
With this scheme, of our selected countries only those in the “Other Asia” group (Qatar, 
United Arab Emirates, Singapore, South Korea, Israel) are affected by the discounting. As can 
be seen when comparing Figure 5 with Figure 4, their abatement cost curve shifts to the left 
and upward as a result of the increase in costs per credit and the reduction in credit 
generation potential. Further, with this discounting scheme about 95% of the projects in the 
current CDM pipeline of these advanced countries would still be feasible with credit prices up 
to 20 US$ on average. Only a hydroelectric project in South Korea and a project for the 
reduction of fugitive natural gas emissions in Qatar would be lost. While projects in advanced 
countries become less competitive, current projects in LDCs are still non-significant at a 
global level, and future potential is still small compared to the Chinese pipeline. This shows 
                                               
8 In this paper, we understand discount factors as the percentage of emission reductions that is not 
credited. For example, a 30% discount factor would imply that only 70% of the measured emission 
reductions receive emission credits. 
Discount factor =   1 -   
2
Country’s emissions/cap Country’s GDP/cap 
World average emissions/cap World average GDP/cap
+
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that discounting cannot serve as a “magic bullet” that suddenly frees up a large CDM 
potential. Other barriers such as availability of domestic capital and skilled workers are so 
entrenched that the revenue from credit sales cannot remove them. CDM alone cannot 
overcome the legacy from decades of failed policies – even if getting some advantages 
compared to projects with a more development-oriented governance. 
 
5.2 Discounting scheme 2 
In this case, the discounting of emission credits is again based on an index composed of per 
capita GDP and per capita emissions, taking as basis the world average of both indicators. 
But discounting starts already when the country reaches half of the world’s average emissions 
and GDP. This scheme is designed to include China among the countries affected by 
discounting. Overcrediting is again not possible. See Table 3 for the resulting discount factors 
and Michaelowa (2008) for a further description of this discounting scheme.  
Under this scheme, both China and Other Asia are affected by discounting. Figure 6 shows 
the result: while the potential in the Asian tigers is greatly reduced and the costs rise sharply, 
making a larger portion of its abatement potential uncompetitive (now also a couple of wind 
energy projects become infeasible, with costs slightly over 20 US$), still most of China’s 
potential – albeit reduced and more expensive – remains competitive with credit prices below 
20 US$. Under these conditions, all CDM projects in the current pipeline in LDCs have smaller 
abatement costs than those in advanced countries. Their volume is however still unimportant. 
There is some hope if we look at the “LDCs potential” curve: assuming the barriers are 
overcome and these projects are implemented, their potential reaches half of the Chinese 
one, with costs below 5 US$/credit. This shows that once the purely technical potential 
becomes available due to the mobilisation of capital and removal of political barriers the 
higher credit revenue compared to other CDM host countries could make the difference. 
Countries that have reformed their policies and enabled the creation of domestic capital could 
use the CDM as lever to accelerate development.  
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Insert Figure 6 approximately here 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
Country-based discounting will of course have an impact on the competitiveness of individual 
CDM host countries in the carbon market, however, as shown above, this impact will depend 
on emissions abatement potentials and costs in the country.  
Discounting could become an interesting instrument for incentivising advanced developing 
countries to leave the CDM and engage in other farther-reaching climate-related 
commitments, as a result of the steep credit cost increases that a discounting factor might 
generate.  
However, this study shows that even under discounting schemes designed to include China, 
Least Developed Countries remain unimportant in terms of abatement potential from the 
CDM pipeline.  
While there is a theoretically large abatement potential to be exploited in Africa, its 
materialisation requires overcoming financial, technical and institutional barriers. Given the 
large cheap potential in China and other countries, it is unlikely that discounting on its own 
will provide sufficient financial incentives to achieve this. But once countries start removing 
barriers, the CDM incentive could play a non-negligible role in development. Nevertheless, 
even under the optimistic scenario, where the financial, technical and institutional barriers in 
these countries are overcome and a larger potential becomes feasible, the larger abatement 
potential and the cheap abatement costs in China and other more attractive host countries 
will be harvested first.  
Thus, discounting would only marginally contribute to enhance the competitiveness (in terms 
of abatement potential and costs) of LDCs within the CDM market. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Project sample 
Project subtype 
Sample 
size 
Project financial 
discount rate(s) 
(%) 
Median 
project 
lifetime 
(years) 
Min and 
max 
lifetime 
(years) 
Host countries 
Biogas power 7 7, 8, 10, 15, 16 10 7, 21 China, South Africa, Guatemala, Honduras, India 
Biogas flaring 4 10 8.5 7, 10 Brazil, Armenia 
Biomass energy 8 7, 8, 10, 15 20 10, 25 South Africa, Kenya, China 
Cement blending (*) 2 - 25 25 India, Indonesia 
Coal mine methane 5 8, 11.8, 13.5 15 7, 20 China 
Energy efficiency own generation 8 8.5, 10, 12, 13, 15 19 10, 20 China 
Fugitive gases 4 10, 15, 20 15 10, 21 Qatar, India, Indonesia, Nigeria 
Hydro existing dam 6 4, 8, 12, 14, 15 25 21, 40 China, Brazil, South Korea, Peru 
Hydro new dam 6 8, 10, 12 26 20, 50 China 
Hydro run of river 5 8, 10 27 20, 30 China 
Landfill gas composting 7 8, 8.5, 10, 12, 15 10 7, 30 China, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia 
Landfill gas flaring 4 8, 10, 13.75 10 7, 15 China, South Africa, Indonesia, Malaysia 
Landfill gas power 9 8, 8.5, 10, 12 15 10, 21 Bangladesh, China 
N2O (adipic) 4 0 - 15 26 21, 30 China, Brazil, South Korea 
N2O (nitric) 10 0 - 15 21 7, 30 Brazil, South Africa, Colombia, China 
New efficient gas power plant 6 8 20 20, 21 China 
Wind 13 8 21 20, 25 China 
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Table 2: Host countries and financial discount rates 
Host country 
Number of 
projects in sample 
(*) 
Range of 
financial discount 
rates used in 
project 
documents 
Standardised 
financial discount  
rate for abatement 
cost calculations 
Source 
Armenia 1 10% 10% Project documents 
Bangladesh 2 12% 12% Project documents 
Brazil 7 0 - 25% 10% Project documents 
China 68 7 - 13.5% 8% Project documents 
Colombia 1 not available 10% By default 10% 
Guatemala 1 7% 8% Project documents 
Honduras 2 not available 10% By default 10% 
India (*) 4 14.72 - 16% 15% Project documents 
Indonesia 4 10 - 18% 10% By default 10% 
Kenya 1 15% 15% Project documents 
Malaysia 5 8 - 10% 10% Project documents 
Nigeria 1 20% 15% Adjusted to 15% for 
comparability 
Peru 2 12 - 14% 12% Project documents 
Qatar 1 10% 10% Project documents 
South Africa 4 10 - 13.75% 10% Project documents 
South Korea 4 0 - 15% 8% Project documents 
(*): The project sample has been constructed to be balanced by project types and not necessarily by 
host countries. For example, there are very few projects from LDCs with reliable financial information. 
Similarly, Indian projects have a tendency to exclude the investment analysis from their project 
documentation, and in those projects with investment analysis, the variance of the resulting costs is 
very high and thus we preferred to leave these data out of the sample.  
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Table 3: Discount factors for the emission credits 
Host country 
GDP/cap 
(PPP, 2000 US$) 
Emissions/cap 
(t CO2eq/year) 
Discount factor  
under scheme 1 
Discount factor  
under scheme 2 
World 8492 4.22 - - 
Qatar 38556 44.90 87% 93% 
United Arab Emirates 22715 24.37 76% 88% 
Singapore 26401 9.93 63% 82% 
Israel 23022 8.65 58% 79% 
South Korea 19837 9.30 56% 78% 
China 6012 3.88 0% 39% 
India 3072 1.05 0% 0% 
Zimbabwe 1813 0.79 0% 0% 
Cambodia 2503 0.27 0% 0% 
Yemen 827 0.89 0% 0% 
Mozambique 1105 0.08 0% 0% 
Tanzania 662 0.11 0% 0% 
Source: IEA, 2007. Own calculations. 
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Figures 
Figure 1: Abatement cost per emissions credit by project subtypes  
with original financial discount rates (USD) 
Based on projects’ Net Present Value and discounted amount of  
emission credits over its lifetime. 
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Figure 2: Abatement cost by project subtypes with  
standardised financial discount rates (USD) 
Based on projects’ Net Present Value and discounted amount of  
emission credits over its lifetime. 
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Figure 3: Investment cost per emissions credit by project subtypes (USD) 
Based on projects’ total investment costs and discounted amount of 
emission credits over its lifetime 
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Figure 4: Standardised abatement cost curves without emissions credit 
discounting 
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Sources: Cost data from Project Design Documents; for HFC-23 projects from Harnisch and Hendricks, 
2000; UNEP TEAP, 2002; Jimenez, 2005. Potentials from URC (2009) and De Gouvello et al. (2008). 
Own calculations. 
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Figure 5: Standardised abatement cost curves with discounting scheme 1 
 
-5
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
0 1000 2000 3000 4000 5000 6000 7000
Abatement potential (MtCO2eq)
A
ba
te
m
en
t c
os
t (
U
SD
/tC
O
2e
q)
LDCs existing LDCs potential China India Other advanced countries
  
Sources: Cost data from Project Design Documents; for HFC-23 projects from Harnisch and Hendricks, 
2000; UNEP TEAP, 2002; Jimenez, 2005. Potentials from URC (2009) and De Gouvello et al. (2008). 
Own calculations. 
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Figure 6: Abatement cost curves with discounting scheme 2 
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Sources: Cost data from Project Design Documents; for HFC-23 projects from Harnisch and Hendricks, 
2000; UNEP TEAP, 2002; Jimenez, 2005. Potentials from URC (2009) and De Gouvello et al. (2008). 
Own calculations. 
 
